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In games with multiple equilibria that are Pareto-ranked, players must somehow 
coordinate their choices to achieve Pareto-efficiency. Games of coordination have been 
widely used in economics to study macroeconomic cycles, technology adoption, sticky 
prices, organizational design, bank runs, and other phenomena.1 These theories cover 
a lot of economic ground but generally leave unanswered a central question: Why is 
one equilibrium selected rather than another? Experimental analysis is well-suited to 
help answer this question because the specialized conditions of a coordination game 
can easily be created in the laboratory. Then a wide range of variables can be altered 
to help infer the principles that guide selection of equilibria. In this paper we describe 
a new selection principle, called "loss-avoidance," and show that the empirical success 
of a related principle, "forward induction," is partly attributable to loss-avoidance. 
Figure 1 shows payoffs in a coordination game we study experimentally in this 
paper. Each of nine players privately picks an integer between one and seven (in­
clusive) , called an "action." After all the players have picked an action, the median
of their actions is computed and announced. Payoffs are determined by a player's 
action and by the median action, as shown in Figure 1. (The payoffs are in pennies.)
This "median action" game was originally studied by Van Huyck, et al. [1991, 1993] 
(hereafter VBB).
The median-action game has two important features. First, players' payoffs are 
decreasing with the (absolute) difference between their own action and the median.
Hence, a player's best action is to choose the number the player believes will be 
the median (row X in Figure 1 is a best response to column X). Then there are
seven pure-strategy Nash equilibria, located along the diagonal. Second, the seven 
pure-strategy equilibria are Pareto-ranked: the higher-action equilibria are better for 
everyone. Choosing 7 is the best of all. 
1See Diamond, 1982; Bryant, 1983; Cooper and John, 1988; Katz and Shapiro, 1986, Ball and 
Romer, 1991; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1992; Becker and Murphy, 1992; and Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983. 
In previous studies, and in our replications, subjects typically choose actions which 
create a median of 4-5 in the first round. When the game is played repeatedly, 
behavior almost always converges to the first-round median. There is persistent 
"coordination failure" because subjects do not coordinate on the best equilibrium 
and choose 7. 
1 Loss-avoidance as a selection principle
Previous research has investigated the "selection principles" players appear to use, 
tacitly, to select one of the many possible equilibria. For example, the equilibrium 
in which everyone chooses 7 obeys the principle of "payoff-dominance" or Pareto­
dominance (see Harsanyi and Selten [1988]). But subjects typically choose actions 
which create a median of 4-5 in the first round, so payoff-dominance in apparently 
not a universally accepted principle. When the game is played repeatedly, behavior 
almost always converges to the first-round median. The strong influence of the first­
round shows that "precedence" is a selection principle: namely, subjects believe that 
an equilibrium which has been picked before is more likely to be chosen again (and 
their beliefs are self-fulfilling). 
In this paper we describe a new selection principle, which we call "loss-avoidance." 
The loss-avoidance principle is that players do not pick strategies which result in cer­
tain losses for themselves, if other (equilibrium) strategies are available. Put differ­
ently, people only pick (and expect others to pick) strategies which might result in a
gain. 
To illustrate loss-avoidance, suppose players in the Figure 1 median-action game 
must pay a commonly-known fee of 225 to play or, equivalently, we subtract 225 from 
all the payoffs. Now the strategies 1-4 are certain to result in a loss. Even though 
1-4 are still equilibrium choices, the loss-avoidance principle selects them out, and 
predicts that only 5-7 will be chosen. 
The loss-avoidance principle is a game-theoretic cousin of findings from research 
on individual choice which highlight the psychological differences between gains and 
losses (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). For example, people appear to dislike 
losses more than they like equal-sized gains ( "loss-aversion" ); and people often seek 
risk to avoid losses, while avoiding risks that can yield equal-sized gains ( "reflection"). 
As a result, the point of reference from which gains and losses are evaluated-or the 
way a choice is framed-can affect the choices people make. 
While these features of losses are thought to guide choices of individuals, the 
loss-avoidance principle is distinctly different because it guides players' beliefs about 
the behavior of others. The difference is illustrated by some experimental sessions in 
which subjects had to pay a fee of 225, but did not know whether others paid the 
same fee or not. In those sessions, adding a fee did not change the choices players 
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made, presumably because subjects could not tell which strategies led to sure losses 
for others, and hence could not use the loss-avoidance principle to shape their beliefs 
about what others would do. 
2 Loss-avoidance and forward induction 
Now suppose the choice of whether to pay the 225 fee and play the game is optional. 
Subjects who opt out earn nothing. In this case, loss-avoidance is coupled with a 
stronger selection principle, "forward induction." In the presence of the option, a 
subject's decision to play a game (rather than opt out) implicitly2 communicates 
the subject's expectations concerning the outcome of the game: A subject will not 
choose an action that guarantees a lower payoff than what could be earned for sure 
by opting out. This reasoning, called forward induction, is formalized by Kohlberg 
and Mertens [1986), van Damme [1989], and Ben-Porath and Dekel [1992] .  Forward 
induction improves coordination because it shrinks the set of plausible equilibria in a 
game. However, experimental evidence on its effectiveness is mixed.3 
Loss avoidance and forward induction are closely linked. Loss-avoidance applies 
if players assume others will avoid certain losses. Forward induction applies if players 
assume others will avoid an opportunity loss, by choosing an equilibrium which is 
better for them than an option they chose to forego. In many games the two principles 
lead to the same set of selected strategies. To isolate the effectiveness of loss avoidance, 
we studied two kinds of median-action games. In games with options to opt out, 
coordination improved, which meant the combination of loss-avoidance and forward 
induction selected better equilibria. But improved coordination was also observed in 
games with no options and possible losses, where forward induction did not apply 
and loss avoidance did. Hence, we conclude that loss avoidance could explain some 
of the improvement in coordination which previously has been attributed exclusively 
to forward induction. 
2Several authors have found that some forms of explicit non-binding pre-play communication (or 
"cheaptalk" ) among players can improve coordination. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1989] 
find that in battle-of-the-sexes games, allowing one player to announce a strategy without a commit­
ment (also known as cheap talk) improves coordination,but allowing both players to communicate 
provides little benefits. However, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1992a] find the opposite 
relationship in a more symmetric coordination game. Van Huyck, Gillette, and Battalio [1992] find 
mixed improvements in coordination when an outside arbiter makes recommendations to the players. 
See also Cooper et al. [1994] . 
3Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil [1993] , and Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1992b] find 
supporting evidence; but Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1993], Schotter, Weigelt, and Wilson 
(1994] and Cachon, Camerer, and Johnson [1990] find contradictory evidence. 
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3 Coordination in the median effort game 
Figure 1 shows payoffs (in pennies) in the median effect game we studied. The game 
corresponds to a natural setting in which players choose levels of effort in a group 
production task. The median effort determines the group's output; higher medians 
yield higher common payoffs. Players are penalized for deviating from the median by 
exerting too little effort (below the median) or too much effort (above the median). 
The individual goal is to exert the median effort. The collective goal is to create the 
largest median effort. 
In their experiments VBB [1991] found with nine players that actions in the initial 
trial of the game were widely distributed around a median of 4 or 5. Repeating the 
game for ten trials created convergence to whichever median had occurred in the initial 
trial. This demonstrates the strong influence of precedence: A subject expects the 
others to choose actions on the assumption that the median will equal the median 
of the previous round. Unfortunately, precedence creates substantial coordination 
failure: If everyone had chosen the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, 7, each subject 
would have made substantially more money (nearly $0.50 more per trial, or $4.50 
more in an experiment which lasted about an hour and paid $9 on average). 
In VBB [1993] eighteen subjects bid for the right to play the median effort game, 
in an ascending-price (English) auction. The auction ended when only nine subjects 
were willing to pay the announced price. After the auction the nine subjects paid the 
auction price then played. 
Since subjects could always quit bidding during the auction and earn nothing, their 
willingness to pay the price P signals their belief that an equilibrium paying at least P 
will result. Auction prices in the first trial were around $2.00 and subjects invariably 
chose actions which gave equilibrium payoffs higher than their bids. (Subjects bidding 
$2.10, for example, would then choose 5 or above in the coordination game; to do 
otherwise would violate dominance.) With repeated trials, prices converged very close 
to $2.60 and subjects usually chose the Pareto-efficient action 7. 
Forward induction explains this behavior, but the English auction is not the only 
preplay mechanism to which forward induction applies. We used a simpler mecha­
nism. Instead of using an auction to create an endogenous cost of participation, we 
announced to nine subjects a publicly known cost to play the game (or entry fee) 
and gave them a chance to opt out and avoid paying the cost. (Note, however, that 
allowing opting out means the number of players falls, which may itself improve co­
ordination.) We call this the "Opt Out" condition of the median effort game. As the 
game's entry fee is raised, forward induction eliminates more and more of the seven 
Nash equilibria, facilitating coordination on the highest-action equilibria.4 
4Given the chance to opt out and earn zero, a subject will only play the game if the payoff 
expected in equilibrium, after paying the entry fee, is greater than the opportunity cost of opting 
out (zero). According to forward induction, expectations of a high median are justified because 
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Loss avoidance can also be applied to the Opt Out game: Players will not choose 
actions that are certain to yield a negative payoff. For example, with an entry fee of 
$1.85 a player cannot earn a positive profit by choosing an action of 3 or lower, but 
choosing an action of 4 or more does earn a positive profit if the outcome median is 
sufficiently high. Note that loss avoidance yields the same recommendations to players 
as forward induction. In fact, the recommendations of loss avoidance and forward 
induction always coincide in games in which forward induction applies.5 However, 
unlike forward induction, loss avoidance does not require the presence of an option 
to opt out. Therefore, we studied behavior in a "Must Play" condition of the median 
effort game, in which players were required to pay an entry fee before playing the 
game. Without a chance to opt out, forward induction does not apply in the Must 
Play game. Any coordination improvement resulting from higher entry costs in the 
Must Play game must be coming from a loss avoidance selection principle. 
3.1 Median effort game: design 
We ran four sessions of the Must Play condition and four sessions of the Opt Out 
condition, with nine rounds in each session. The first three rounds of both conditions 
were identical, to establish an observational baseline and create an empirical median. 
The entry cost was zero and players could not opt out in either condition. In rounds 4-
9 subjects could opt out in the Opt Out condition, but not in the Must Play condition. 
Players who chose to opt out receive 0 points for the round. 
The entry fee was raised from 0 to $1.85 in rounds 4-6. The cost of $1.85 was 
chosen to keep profits positive (net of entry cost) if the initial medians were 4 or 5, 
as we thought they would be based on VBB's results. This change is predicted to 
be innocuous; it tests whether any change in the entry cost can trigger a shift to a 
higher median. 6 
The entry cost was raised from $1.85 to $2.25 in rounds 7-9. Forward induction 
predict subjects who opt to play in the Opt Out condition will then choose actions 6 or 
7 (which pay $2.40 or $2.60 in equilibrium). Forward induction predicts nothing about 
the Must Play condition. Loss avoidance predicts subjects will play 6 or 7 in both Opt 
Out and Must Play conditions (since playing 5 only earns $2.20 in equilibrium, not 
only players with high expectations will play, and they will choose high numbers. Players with low 
median expectations opt out, and they have no influence over the median. 
50ne reader suggested trying to separate loss-avoidance and forward induction with an Opt Out 
condition in which players can earn $2.25 and not play, or play and pay nothing (as in Abdalla, 
Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe and Ross [1989] , and Schotter, et al. [1994]), so there is no explicit entry 
fee. Forward induction applies in this game, but loss avoidance does too if the opportunity cost of 
not earning $2.25 is viewed as a loss. 
6Cooper et al. [1993] report that the inclusion of a small entry fee, which is smaller than the 
lowest payoff of any equilibrium, does improve coordination. Forward induction and loss avoidance 
both predict this should have no effect on coordination, so its actual effect represents an interesting 
puzzle. 
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enough to recoup the entry cost of $2.25). Precedence suggests subjects will choose 
actions corresponding to the median of the previous round. 
Subjects were University of Pennsylvania undergraduates recruited from announce­
ments in classes and public sign-up sheets. Students sat in private cubicles. Each 
experiment began with a public reading of the instructions (see Appendix), and a 
quiz to ensure that each subject understood the task and how payoffs were com­
puted. Subjects were paid in cash immediately after the experiment. Sessions took 
45 minutes and subjects earned about $9 on average. 
In both conditions the subjects did not know the number of rounds in the session 
or the entry costs and options in future rounds. In the Must Play condition subjects 
did not know there was an option in other (Opt Out) sessions. Subjects were told 
(truthfully) that they all had the same payoff table, and the payoff table would not 
change during the experiment. 
Each round began with the experimenter publicly announcing the entry cost and 
announcing, in the Opt Out sessions, whether subjects could opt out and how much 
they would earn for opting out. Subjects then either chose an action or opted out. 
They also predicted the smallest, largest, and median action in each round. They 
earned a dime for each correct prediction, and were informed of their correct minimum 
and maximum predictions at the end of the experiment. We collected predictions from 
the subjects in order to compare their beliefs about the future median with their own 
actions. At the end of each round, players were told the median actions (not the full 
distribution of actions).7 
3.2 Median effort game: results 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of action choices by the subjects in each session. In 
each round of a session (a column) vertical rectangles outline the range of actions 
picked during that round. Numbers within the rectangle represent the number of 
subjects choosing each action. (The numbers in each column sum to nine, the number 
of subjects.) The open box in each rectangle is the median action. The asterisk in 
each column denotes the median of the subject's predictions about the median. 
Behavior across all eight sessions was similar in the first three rounds, as expected: 
There was wide variation in first-round actions; and by the third round actions always 
converged toward a.median of4 or 5, and 71 percent (51 of the 72) subjects chose the 
median. These results sharply replicate VBB [1991, 1993] , and confirm the strength 
of precedence. 
7In the Opt Out condition, when the number of subjects playing the game was even and the 
median was in between two different numbers, a coin was flipped to determine which of the two was 
the announced median. This rule was explained to the subjects in the instructions, but there was 
never a need to implement it. 
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When the entry cost rose in round 4 to $1.85, actions shifted upward a bit but 
the median action was the same in five sessions and rose by one in three sessions. 
The small shift in actions suggests that changing the entry cost has some influence 
on beliefs and behavior but the influence is minor. 
The crucial comparison between loss avoidance and forward induction comes in 
rounds 7-9, when the entry cost rises from $1.85 to $2.25. Loss avoidance predicts an 
increase in actions in both conditions, but forward induction predict an increase only 
in the Opt Out sessions. Must Play and Opt Out conditions showed similar behavior 
in rounds 7-9: The median increased in round 7 in seven out of eight sessions (see 
Table I). In the final rounds there were a total of 18 choices of 6 and 18 choices of 7 
in the Opt Out sessions, and exactly the same distribution in the Must Play sessions. 
Hypothesis testing suggests a modest difference in the Opt Out and Must Play 
conditions. Using a Fisher exact test we reject the hypothesis (at p=0.11) that actions 
of 6 or 7 are chosen with equal probability in round 7 of the two conditions. We can 
reject the hypothesis (at p=0.10) that the distribution of action differences between 
rounds 6 and 7 are the same in the two conditions. The data suggest that loss 
avoidance, absent forward induction, does not generate precisely the same changes 
in medians (and improvement in coordination) as forward induction does, but the 
changes are quite similar. 
There are several other findings. Table II compares the differences between actions 
and predicted medians. 8 Any non zero differences (e.g. predicting the median would 
be 4, and playing 5) suggest subjects did not give careful predictions of the median, 
or did not best-respond to their predicted median. Only 20 percent of the actions and 
median predictions were different. When they differed, subjects were more likely to 
choose an action higher than their predicted median (a positive difference) than vice 
versa, perhaps trying to pull the group up to a higher median. Furthermore, positive 
differences between actions and expectations are evenly distributed among all the 
rounds. This confirms that the increases in median actions observed in round 7 are 
cause by rising expectations, rather than an increased willingness to submit actions 
higher than expectation (which would reflect a decrease in best-response actions). 
Table III gives evidence of converge dynamics which strongly support the influence 
of precedence.9 Subjects whose action was higher (lower) than the median in the 
previous round tended to decrease (increase) their action. Subjects who chose the 
8Data are pooled across sessions within a condition to improve power. Option actions are not 
included in the table; but,subjects made predictions for the minimum, maximum and median even 
if they opted out. 
9Crawford [1995] estimates an analytical model to explain convergence behavior in these coor­
dination games. A critical assumption of his model is that players start with diffuse expectations 
regarding the median, and through adaptive modification based on observed information (history 
of repeated play) these expectations converge to an equilibrium. The belief data we gathered are 
roughly consistent with Crawford's model, since initial predictions of the median are widely dis­
persed, they converge tightly around previously-observed medians with experience. 
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median tended not to change their action (except in rounds 4 and 7, when they often 
increased). The data explain why the initial medians were so persistent- subjects 
mostly converged toward it from above and below, except for some upward drift in 
rounds 4 and 7. (Note that the upward shift is more dramatic in round 7, when 80 
percent of the subjects shift upward, than in round 4 when less than half do.) 
Table IV shows some support for forward induction in the medians predicted by 
players who chose to opt out or play. The medians predicted by subjects who played 
are higher (95 percent are 6 or 7) then the medians predicted by those who opted 
out (53 percent predicted 5 or less). The two distributions are clearly different ( 
x2=11.0, p=0.01), suggesting that some portion of subjects may have used reasoning 
like forward induction to justify high expectations. However, forward induction jus­
tifies high expectations for all subjects, and hence it appears that forward induction 
is not universally applied. But universal application is not necessary because the 
subjects which do not follow forward induction opt out, and thus have no influence 
on the final median. 
3.3 Median effort game with Private Entry Costs 
Although loss avoidance explains the behavior observed in the Must Play sessions, it 
is possible that loss avoidance is confounded with another effect. There is substantial 
evidence in psychology that people take actions to recoup sunk costs rather than 
ignore them.10 It is possible that the median rises in the Median Effort game merely 
because each subject chooses a high number in an effort to recover the sunk entry fee. 
To separate these explanations, we ran two sessions like the Must Play sessions, 
except that the entry fee was not announced publicly (this condition is called "Private 
Cost" ) . Each player knew his or her own entry fee, but did not know every other 
subjects' fee. (In fact, as in the Must Play condition, every subject had the same 
fee.) If subjects individually succumb to the sunk cost fallacy an increase in the entry 
fees will raise the median because the aggregate effect of each subject's attempt to 
recover the fee will result in a higher median. However, if subjects only use the loss 
avoidance principle to fix their beliefs about how others will play, then in the Private 
Cost condition actions will not rise when the fee is increased. (Note that even if 
subjects suspect others' fees are the same as their own, unless that fact is common 
knowledge the loss avoidance principle can't be applied. ) 
In fact, the median did not change when the entry fee rose in round 7 of the Private 
Cost sessions (see Figure 3). The distribution of round 7 actions in the Private Cost 
10There is considerable evidence in psychology that subjects take riskier actions to recoup sunk 
costs. See Arkes and Blumer [1985] , Aronson and Mills [1959] , Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett and Miller 
[1978) ,Freedman and Fraser [1966) , McGlothlin [1956] , and Staw [1976] . Thaler (1980] , uses the ten­
dency toward risk-preference in the domain of losses, from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979] to explain the sunk cost fallacy. Heath (in press] modifies this view with demonstrations that 
people only spend a different kind of resource to recoup a sunk resource cost. 
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sessions is significantly different than in the Must Play sessions with public costs ( 
x2 = 20.4, p=0.005). The distribution of differences in actions from round 6 to 7 is 
significantly different too ( x2 = 11.0, p=0.005). Thus, it appears that subjects do 
not exhibit a sunk cost fallacy in the Must Play setting. 
3.4 Pass through median effort game. 
Coordination improved in the Must Play sessions with a publicly announced entry 
fee, but loss avoidance does not require an explicit fee. Furthermore, it is possible 
coordination would improve in these sessions by merely announcing a number (such 
as "225") which has no influence on the subjects' payoffs. The number itself could 
be focal. Thus, to test loss avoidance without the possibility of contamination by 
a "focal number effect" we conducted two "Pass Through" sessions. These sessions 
are identical to the Must Play sessions but there is no announcement of an entry fee. 
To incorporate the entry fee implicitly, the subjects are told that the payoff table 
may change from round to round. In the first three rounds the Figure 1 payoff table 
is used. In the next three rounds the subjects were given a payoff table that was 
equivalent in structure to Figure 1, but all payoffs were reduced by 185. In the last 
three rounds the subjects used a table with the payoffs reduced by 225. In each round 
the experimenter collected the previous payoff table and distributed the new table. 
Only in rounds 4 and 7 did the payoffs in the new tables change. Since the entry fees 
were implicitly incorporated into the payoff table, the subjects did not know anything 
about fees or focal numbers. 
Figure 4 shows that the subjects' behavior in these two sessions did not differ 
much from behavior in the Must Play sessions: Initial choices are widely dispersed 
around the median of 4 or 5; by round 6 there is convergence to an equilibrium (72 
percent of subjects select the median action); and in round 7 of both sessions there is 
an upward equilibrium shift. We weakly accept the hypothesis that the Pass Through 
and Must Play sessions have the same distribution of actions in round 7 and 9 (p=.13 
and p=.15 by Fisher exact test), and accept the hypothesis that the two types of 
sessions have the same distribution of median beliefs in round 7 (p=.21 by Fisher 
exact test) .11 We conclude that charging an implicit fee can affect coordination too, 
ruling out the theory that our Must Play results are due to focal numbers announced 
as explicit fees. This provides additional support for loss avoidance as a selection 
principle. 
11 We reject that. Pass Through .and the Must Play sessions have the same ·distribution of action 
differences in round 7 (p=.10 by Fisher exact test), but this weakly significant difference is not large 
in magnitude. 
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3.5 Declining cost median effort 
Experience can certainly play a role in coordination. It is possible that as subjects 
gain experience they realize the benefit of better coordination. Unfortunately, since 
an inferior equilibrium is established in the early rounds the subjects need some signal 
to trigger a break from the established equilibrium and initiate higher coordination. 
Any interruption in the normal procedure of the game, such as a change in the fee 
charged, could serve as a signal. Indeed, VBB [1990] find evidence that coordination 
does improve when a transition occurs between different treatments of the experi­
ment (after some experience has been obtained). We conducted two sessions of the 
"Declining Costs" median effort game in order to rule out experience or transition 
effects as primary explanations for improved coordination in round 7 of the Must 
Play treatments. 
The Declining Costs sessions are identical to the Must Play session except the 
order of fees is reversed: a fee of 225 in the first three rounds, 185 in the middle three 
rounds, and no fee in the last three rounds. Beginning round 1 with the high fee of 
225 eliminates transition or experience effects as an explanation for the improvement 
in coordination in round 7 that we observed in the Must Play sessions.12 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of actions selected in the Declining Cost sessions. 
They indicate that higher coordination is achieved in round 1 (with a fee of 225) than 
in the first round of the Must Play sessions (with a fee of zero). The distribution 
of actions and median predictions are higher in the Declining Costs sessions ( x2 = 
10.16, p=0.005; and x2 =10.99, p=.005). Furthermore, we accept the hypothesis 
that the distribution of actions in round 7 of the Declining Costs and Must Play 
sessions are the same (Fisher exact test, p=.29). We conclude that subjects apply 
loss avoidance even with no experience, and loss avoidance can assist in the prediction 
of subjects' beliefs prior to playing a coordination game. 
3.6 Minimum effort game 
In the median effort game each member's payoff depends on the group's median effort 
(as in tug-of-war). One slacker has little overall influence on the payoffs if others put 
in high effort. In the "minimum effort" game, a player's payoffs is determined by 
the minimum number chosen in the group and the deviation of his or her number 
from the minimum. (This game is sometimes called the "weakest link" game after 
the expression "A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.") In the minimum 
effort game coordination is more difficult because players will choose a high action 
only if they believe every other player will choose a high action too. In previous 
12 Again, we do not entirely reject the possibility of significant experience or transition effects in 
round 7. Instead, we wish to show that these are not the sole explanation for higher coordination 
when a high fee of 225 is charged. 
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experiments, inefficient equilibria of 1 are typical with groups of three to 16 subjects 
playing repeatedly [VBB, 1990; Knez and Camerer, 1995]. 
We conducted some experiments with the minimum effort game because it stress 
tests the ability of loss avoidance to improve coordination, and might reveal a bigger 
difference between loss avoidance and forward induction than we saw with the median 
effort game. As in the median effort game, the predictions of loss avoidance and 
forward induction are identical in the minimum effort game, but the subjects' belief 
in these concepts must be stronger (and more uniform) for coordination to improve 
when the fees are raised. 
We tested Must Play and Opt Out conditions of the minimum effort game. The 
payoff table used was identical to the one in the median effort game (see Figure 1), but 
experimental procedures differed in three ways. First, the minimum action chosen, 
not the median, was announced at the end of each round and was used to calculate 
payoffs. (The full distribution of actions was never announced.) Second, subjects 
were asked to make a prediction for the minimum action, rather than the median. 
Third, subjects were given $8.00 before the session began to prevent them from losing 
money.13 
Figure 5 shows the subjects' choices in two Must Play and two Opt Out sessions of 
the minimum effort game. Behavior in the two conditions was dramatically different: 
Raising the entry cost did not help in Must Play, but it did help in Opt Out. The 
hypotheses of equal distributions in action choices in round 7, and action differences 
from round 6 to 7, can both be easily rejected ( x2 = 24.9, p=.005; and x2 =14.0, 
p=.005). Thus, loss avoidance alone (in Must Play) is not enough to generate coordi­
nation on high equilibria in the minimum effort game but loss avoidance and forward 
induction together (in Opt Out) do improve coordination. For example, in session 
13 only one subject opted out in round 7; that player then opted to play in rounds 8 
and 9. 
Comparison across experiments shows that round 1 choices are significantly lower 
in the minimum effort game than in the median effort game (x2 = 13.3, p=.005). 
The initial difference persists: Actions in round 7 and round 9 Must Play sessions are 
significantly different across the minimum and median games ( x2 =30.9, p=.005, and 
x2 =45.8, p=.005 respectively), but in the minimum and median Opt Out sessions 
all choices in these rounds are 6 or 7. 
Loss avoidance does have some effect in the minimum effort game, even though it 
is not strong enough to overcome precedence. In round 3 of the Must Play sessions 
13This cash stake was provided because in a pilot session of the Must Play condition with no stake 
many subjects became risk-seeking (choosing high actions when the previous round's minimum was 
1) when their total earnings became negative. The pattern of the actual minimum in the pilot did 
not differ from the two sessions with the cash stake. In two pilot sessions of the Opt Out condition 
without the $8 stake, total payoffs of the subjects did not become negative and behavior was similar 
to the sessions reported. 
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only 16 percent of the actions were 4 or greater. When the entry cost was raised to 
$1.85 in round 4, 72 percent of the subjects chose 4 or greater. This behavior is also 
seen in Table V, which shows convergence dynamics. Subjects who chose an action 
above the previous round's minimum were likely to lower their action choice, except 
in rounds 4 and 7. In rounds 4 and 7 there was a tendency for subjects to raise 
their action choices, but the tendency was not strong enough to budge the minimum 
because at least one subject picked the same action (or less) in each round. 
A clue to the coordination success in the Opt Out sessions is found in the mini­
mums predicted by subjects who opted out or played. As in the median effort game, 
the three subjects who played in round 7 had significantly higher beliefs about the 
minimum (13 of 14 thought it would be 6) than the subjects who opted out (only one 
of four thought it would be 6), as forward induction predicts ( x2 =8.3, p=0.025). 
The more optimistic beliefs of the subjects who played generates coordination on a 
higher equilibrium. 
One feature of our design may overstate the case for forward induction in the 
minimum effort game. In the Opt Out condition, the fact that players can Opt Out 
implies fewer players actually play, which reduces strategic uncertainty and makes 
coordination easier. (For example, VBB [1993] found that in two-player games co­
ordination was much better than in 9-player games. However, subjects were aware 
of the number of their opponents, whereas in the Opt Out sessions they must form 
expectations regarding the number which will play.) The VBB auction design cleverly 
fixed the number of players, for precisely this reason, but it has not been applied to 
minimum effort games.14 
4 Discussion 
Our experiments help understand how people play coordination games. First sub­
jects repeatedly played a coordination game, the "median effort" game studied by 
Van Huyck et al [1992] ,  which has seven pure-strategy equilibria that are Pareto­
ranked. They gravitated systematically to either of two (inefficient) equilibria. Then 
we altered payoffs by imposing a fee on subjects. We imposed fees in two different 
conditions, called Must Play and Opt Out. 
In Must Play experiments, all subjects had to pay the fee. When the previous 
equilibria yielded a payoff less than the fee, imposing a fee caused subjects to coordi­
nate on a higher-payoff equilibrium. It appears that subjects use the desire to avoid 
losses as a selection principle: Loss- avoidance directs attention away from equilibria 
14In VBB's auction design, the number of players who actually played the coordination game was 
held fixed because 18 subjects bid for nine spots in the game. A hybrid of their design and ours, in 
which we charge players a fee, allow them to opt out, but fix the number of actual players (if too 
many opt out then they do not play) would hold strategic uncertainty fixed in our fixed-fee design. 
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that yield payoffs less than the fee and coordinates expectations on equilibria with 
payoffs greater than the fee. 
In Opt Out experiments, subjects could pay the fee and play the coordination 
game (with others who had paid), or could opt to not play and earn nothing. Under 
these conditions, the selection principle of "forward induction" predicts a possible 
improvement in coordination: A player's willingness to pay the fee signals the expec­
tation that an equilibrium will result which yields a payoff larger than the fee. (If the 
player expected a payoff lower than the fee, and was rational, he or she would opt 
out.) Imposing the fee did move subjects to a higher-payoff equilibrium. 
Notice that in the Opt Out conditions, the logic of forward induction and the loss­
avoidance selection principle both predict movement to a better equilibrium when a 
fee is imposed. But in Must Play conditions forward induction does not apply because 
all subjects must pay the fee. Since we observe shifts in equilibrium in both conditions, 
we conclude that loss-avoidance is an effective selection principle in these games, and 
accounts for some of the effectiveness of forward induction. 
Two further kinds of evidence suggest that the power of forward induction is not 
wholly derived from loss-avoidance. First, forward induction predicts that subjects 
who opt in and play will have more optimistic beliefs about the resulting behavior 
of others than subjects who opt out. By measuring subjects' expectations directly, 
we saw that this was true. However, forward induction is not applied by everyone, 
because many subjects chose to opt out (though usually for only one round). 
Second, we experimented with a "minimum-action" or weak-link game, in which 
coordination among all subjects is required to achieve the Pareto superior equilib­
rium. In Must Play conditions, loss-avoidance by itself did not work well enough 
and subjects failed to achieve a profitable equilibrium (payoffs were below the fee). 
But in Opt Out conditions, the combination of loss-avoidance and forward induction 
enabled subjects to reach an equilibrium yielding more than the fee. So there is some 
evidence that forward induction, by modifying the beliefs of subjects who choose to 
play a game, enhances coordination better than the loss avoidance principle alone 
can. 
Three variants of the median effort game were used to clarify our understanding of 
loss avoidance. First, we demonstrate that loss avoidance improves coordination even 
when subjects have no experience playing a game (in our Declining Cost sessions). 
This is important, because, as shown by Crawford and Haller [1990] and Crawford 
[1995] , subjects' beliefs prior to playing a coordination game can influence which 
equilibrium they eventually coordinate upon.15 Second, the effect is distinct from a 
"bell-ringing effect", in which any change during the experiment serves as an a device 
players can use to coordinate a mass switch to a better equilibrium, 16 because the 
15In their work, these authors assume subjects begin with diffuse prior beliefs which they do not 
attempt to explain. Loss avoidance explains part of these initial beliefs. 
16 A focal number effect suggests that coordination could improve by the announcement of a 
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effect occurs even when the fee is subtracted from payoffs rather than announced 
(Pass Through sessions). Third, and most importantly, loss-avoidance is a selection 
principle rather than an individual-level response to possible losses, like the "sunk cost 
fallacy" or reflection effect. We established this in Private Costs sessions in which 
the fee each subject paid was only privately known, rather than commonly known. 
In these sessions, raising the fee did not change behavior, so we conclude that loss 
avoidance modifies a subject's belief regarding how other subjects will play a game. 
5 Remarks about loss-avoidance and its implica­
tions 
We remark about three features of loss-avoidance as a selection principle and one 
implication. 
1. Notice that if a game has some Pareto-ranked equilibria, subtracting a constant 
from all payoffs, and applying loss-avoidance, will exclude the lowest Pareto­
ranked equilibria first. As the constant is increased, higher-ranked equilibria are 
excluded but better equilibria are never excluded before worse ones. So loss­
avoidance naturally guides people toward efficiency. Hence, while loss-avoidance 
may be rooted in an individual tendency to distinguish losses and gains (which 
may be debatably rational), it clearly improves social rationality, by helping 
people move in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. 
2. Since loss-avoidance affects equilibrium selection, the way outcomes are coded 
or framed, or accounting manipulations which post costs at different periods of 
time, can have real effects on behavior and efficiency. Our data illustrate this 
possibility concretely. Charging a fee in the first three periods (in the Declining 
Cost sessions) created a high-payoff equilibrium in those periods, which per­
sisted throughout the experiment due to the effect of precedent. In contrast, 
charging the $2.25 fee at the end (in Must Play sessions) permitted low-payoff 
equilibrium choices before the fee was imposed. On average, subjects earned 
substantially more in the Declining Costs sessions than in the Must Play ses­
sions ($9.54 versus $7.54). Even though total fees imposed were the same, when 
the fees were imposed made a large difference. 
3. There is an interesting, subtle relationship between payoff-dominance, risk­
dominance, and loss-avoidance. Consider the two-person version of "stag hunt" 
shown in Table VI (which is a simplified minimum-action game). This game 
was studied experimentally by Cooper et al [1992a] (except the secure payoff of 
600 was actually 800 in their games). In the no fee version, their subjects over­
whelmingly chose the secure strategy 1, which yields a certain 600, even though 
number which has no monetary consequence. See Mehta, Starmer and Sugden [1994] for a discussion 
of focal principles on coordination. 
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(2,2) is a payoff-dominant equilibrium. The equilibrium (1,1) is risk-dominant 
[Harsanyi & Selten, 1988], and intuitively less risky. Choosing 2 is riskier be­
cause its payoff could be 0 or 1000, versus the certain 600 from choosing 1. 
Loss-avoidance makes no prediction because all strategies yield only nonnega­
tive payoffs. 
Now consider the same game with a fee of 900 subtracted from each payoff, as 
shown in the middle of Table VI. Nothing in the standard equilibrium analysis 
changes: The equilibrium (1,1) is still risk-dominant and (2,2) is still payoff­
dominant. But now loss-avoidance points toward the efficient outcome (2,2) 
rather than (1,1), because choosing 1 guarantees a loss and choosing 2 might 
yield a gain. We conjecture that strategy 2 choices will be much more common 
when the fee is imposed. 
The change created by subtracting a fee illustrates how risk-dominance ignores 
the intuitive idea that risk stems from chance of loss. In the no-fee case, choos­
ing 2 is risky because the possible payoffs are variable-either 0 or 1000. In 
the fee case, the payoff-variability of strategy 2 is suddenly desirable because 
it may yield a gain (which strategy 1 cannot). Many people report that they 
think of risk as a combination of probability of loss (or negative semi-variance) 
and payoff dispersion (e.g., MacCrimmon and Wehrung [1986]; Shapira [1995]). 
For such people, strategy 2 seems more risky in the no-fee case, but strategy 1 
seems more risky in the fee case because it guarantees a loss. The loss- avoid­
ance principle captures the intuitive notion that risk is the chance of loss, and 
predicts that subjects will avoid (and believe others will too) strategy 1 in the 
fee case. 
Another variation in Table VI, shown on the right hand side, subtracts the fee 
of 900 only from player I's payoffs. This version tests the social robustness of 
loss avoidance. Now loss avoidance only applies to player I, so it moves choices 
toward (2,2) only if player II knows I avoids losses (and I knows II knows that, 
etc.). 
4. Our results have one important implication for experimental design: Whether 
payoffs are gains or losses could matter. Experimentalists usually adjust the 
payoffs in games or markets so that the expected payoff (under equilibrium pre­
dictions) is close to the opportunity wage of subjects, and is large enough to 
motivate subjects to think carefully about their choices. Less attention is paid to 
the range of payoffs. Our data suggest that in situations with multiple equilib­
ria, and common knowledge of payoffs, the range of payoffs is important because 
money-losing outcomes are less likely to be chosen. In the stag-hunt game, for 
example, previous experiments show strong support for the risk-dominant equi­
librium and little support for the payoff-dominant equilibrium. We conjecture 
that subtracting a constant from payoffs (and giving subjects a compensat­
ing fixed payment in advance) will reverse this result, shifting support to the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium. 
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Table 1: Timing of Median Changes in the Median Effort Game 
First cost increase, 
round 4: 
Second cost increase, 
round 7: 
All other rounds, no 
cost increase: 
Must Play 
(Sessions 1,2,3,4) 
No change Change 
2 2 
1 3 
21 3 
16 
Opt Out 
(Sessions 5,6, 7 ,8) 
No change Change 
3 1 
0 4 
24 0 
Fraction of 
rounds with a 
median change 
37 .5% 
87.5% 
6.3% 
Table 2: The distribution of the difference between chosen actions and 
predicted medians in the median effort game 
Must Play 
(Session 1,2,3,4) 
Opt Out 
(Sessions 5,6,7,8) 
Rounds Positive Zero Negative Positive Zero Negative 
1-3 12 78 18 18 77 13 
4 7 26 3 5 30 l 
5-6 12 47 3 8 60 4 
7 3 31 2 2 19 0 
8-9 7 64 l 5 66 1 
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Table 3: Best response dynamics in the median effort game 
Rounds: 4 
Previous action higher than median:* 
Increase or same actions: 5 
Decrease action 4 
Previous action is best response: 
Increase action: 11 
Sarne action: 11 
Decrease action: l 
Previous action lower than median: 
Increase action: 3 
Decrease or same action: 1 
* number of subjects 
18 
Must Play 
Session 1,2,3,4 
7 
4 
1 
21 
6 
0 
2 
2 
1,2,3 , 
5,6,8,9 
24 
36 
21 
87 
2 
31 
5 
4 
3 
4 
9 
Opt Out 
Sessions 5,6, 7,8 
7 
4 
0 
14 
1,2,3, 
5,6,8,9 
16 
27 
11 
14 3 112 
3 0 3 
0 0 27 
2 0 7 
Table 4: Median beliefs of the subjects in Round 7 of the median effort game Opt Out sessions 
Median beliefs of subjects who 
Opted out Played 
Session 5 5, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6 6, 6, 7 
Session 6 4, 4, 5, 6, 7 6, 6, 6, 7 
Session 7 5, 6, 6 6, 6, 7, 7, 7, 7 
Session 8 6 5, 6, 6, 6, 7, 7, 7, 7 
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Table 5: Best response dynamics in the minimum effort game 
Rounds: 4 
Previous action higher than previous minumum* 
Increase or same actions: 9 
Decrease action 0 
Previous action equals previous mininum 
Increase action: 8 
Same action: 1 
Decrease action: 0 
* number of subjects 
20 
Must Play 
Session 1,2,3,4 
7 
11 
2 
4 
1 
0 
1,2,3 
5,6,8,9 
31 
55  
6 
15 
1 
Opt Out 
Sessions 5,6, 7,8 
4 7 1,2,3 
5,6,8,9 
7 2 20 
1 0 28 
5 12 2 
0 0 48 
0 0 0 
Table VI: Payoffs in "Stag Hunt" Games 
Fee of 900 
No fee Fee of 900 Player I only 
II II II 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
1 600,600 600,0 -300,-300 -300,-900 -300,600 -300,0 
I 2 0,600 1000,1000 -900,-300 +100,+100 -900,600 +100,1000 
21 
Your 
action: 
Figure 1: Median effort game payoff table 
l 
l 140 
2 130 
3 100 
4 50 
5 -20 
6 -llO 
7 -220 
Median action 
2 3 4 5 
150 140 110 60 
160 170 160 130 
150 180 190 180 
120 170 200 210 
70 140 190 220 
0 90 160 210 
-90 20 110 180 
22 
6 
-10 
80 
150 
200 
230 
240 
230 
7 
-100 
10 
100 
170 
220 
250 
260 
Figure 2: Actions selections in the median effort game: Must Play and Opt Out versions 
Must Play sessions 1,2,3,4 Opt Out sessions 5,6,7,8 
Round 
Option Payoff 
Entzyfee 
1 
7 
6 
§ 5 
".;::j 4 < 3 
2 
l 2 3 
na na na 
0 0 0 
Session # 1  
Session #2 
4 5 6 7 
na na na na 
"' ""' .,., "' oc � 00 .... - - .... 
8 9 
na na 
.,., "' .... .... .... .... 
option 
7 
6 
= 5 0 
".;::j 4 < 3 
2 
l 
option 
.g 
< 
l 2 3 
na na na 
0 0 0 
Session #5 
Session #6 
! -'������������--
Session #3 Session #7 
option 
7 
6 
= 
0 
5 
·n 4 
< 3 
2 
1 
Session #4 Session #8 
4 5 6 7 
0 0 0 0 
.,., .,., "' "' 
� � oc .... - .... 
option � 
23 
8 9 
0 0 
V> "' N .... .... .... 
Figure 3: Actions selections in the private cost median effort game 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option Payoff na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Private Entry Fee 
"' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' .,.. "' 00 00 00 N N N � 00 00 N N N 0 0 0 - - - N N N 0 0 0 - - N N N 
Session #9 Session #10  
j � 1 3• =�;1111 
Figure 4: Actions selections in the pass through median effort game 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option Payoff na na na na na na na na na 
Implicit Entry Fee 
"' "' .,.. "' "' .,.. 00 00 00 N N N 0 0 0 - - - N N N 
Session # 1 1 
7 " 21111=== = 6 § 0 ·.= 5 ·a < 4 < 
3 
2 
1 
24 
2 
1 
1 2 3 
na na na 
0 0 0 
Session #12  
115· 5 .. < >, 
4 5 6 7 8 9 
na na na na na na 
"' "' "' .,.. .,.. .,.. 00 00 00 N N N - - - N N N 
-�=1� 4• 7• 
Figure 5: Actions selections in the declining cost median effort game 
Round 
Option Payoff 
Entry Fee 
4 
3 
2 
l 
l 2 3 
na na na 
"' .,., .,., 
"' "' "' "' "' "' 
Session #13 
4 5 
na na 
"' "' 
� � 
6 7 8 
na na na 
"' "" - 0 0 
9 
na 
0 
7 
6 
§ 5 
� 4 3 
2 
1 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
na na na na na na na na na 
Session #14 
Figure 6: Actions selections in the minimum effort game: must play and opt opt versions 
Must Play sessions 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Option Payoff na na na na na na na na 
Entry Fee 
.,... "' V) "' "' 00 "" � "' "' 0 0 0 - - "' "' 
Session #15 
Option 
7 
6 
Q 5 0 
·.:::i 4 () 
< 3 
2 
1 
Session #17 
Option 
9 
na 
V) "' "' 
25 
Opt Out sessions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
na na na 0 0 0 0 
.,.., "' "' "' "" � � "' 0 0 0 - "' 
Session#l6 
Option 111 m 
= 0 
".;::l 
� 
I i• 3• I 
Option 
7 
6 
§ 5 
Session #18 
� 4 3 , c 
2 
���� 
l 
8 9 
0 0 
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